After the storm we must wait for blue skies

General (ret.) Wesley K. Clark

May 1, 2003

Times of London

AFTER the thunderstorm of Iraqi freedom, it is only natural that it should take time before blue skies appear. But the fight was never just about weapons of mass destruction, whatever the rhetoric. Rather, the war was the inauguration of a new US strategy for the region.

The strategy begins with Iraq, where more than 100,000 US troops, and hopefully 15-20,000 Brits, will help Iraq to achieve a democratic government that is anti-terrorist and will turn over any weapons of mass destruction.

No theocracy. It may be difficult - already more troops have been ordered in to help to secure Baghdad - but the Secretary of Defense has said that we are not leaving until it is done.

Then there is Syria, long-branded a terrorist state. Those troops in Iraq send out a strong signal. The case against Bashir al-Assad is mounting. That pressure alone may force change in Syria. Already it has closed its borders with Iraq, turned in at least one Iraqi official and vowed to expand co-operation.

The visit to Damascus by Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, might extract more, although the list of potential demands - expelling Hezbollah, leaving Lebanon, ending support for terrorism and giving up chemical weapons - is certainly more than Syria will agree to, short of some larger regional settlement. But the more Syria resists, the easier to justify US actions, at least to an American public still recovering from the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Next is Iran, supporting terrorism and needing perhaps another two to three years to assemble its first nuclear weapon. The strategy here will be to act indirectly, weakening the mullahs by cutting off support to Hezbollah and attempting to fuel internal resistance. A pre-emptive strike against nuclear facilities remains an option, perhaps a bit in the future.

Then there is Saudi Arabia. Here the strategy is to reduce the US presence in order to free the Saudis to take stiffer measures against their own extremists. This is feasible now that the US is inside Iraq and, with the promise of Iraqi oil, has the advantage of suggesting to the Saudi Government that it is no longer so indispensable to the US.

Finally, there remains the challenge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There the Administration is proceeding on two fronts: directly with the "road map", designed as much for European consumption as for the region, and indirectly through pressure on Syria and others to end support for the Palestinian resistance. The pace here is measured: many believe that this problem becomes more manageable only as US pressure against Arab states grows. Any real agreement requires Israeli concessions, unlikely before the November 2004 elections.

You won't find this strategy outlined in any official public document, but don't doubt its appeal. Americans are still basking in the afterglow of military triumph. There's little tolerance for questions about justifying the war, its conduct or the aftermath. A friend watching CNN e-mailed me: "Please tell them to quit showing all these scenes of looting in Baghdad; it's too disturbing."

You can be certain that the US strategy will not go unchallenged. The shootings at Fallujah are the strongest incidence yet of popular Iraqi resistance to American presence. Iran appears not have been behind this incident, but she and others will certainly note US vulnerabilities.

One hundred thousand Americans on the ground in Iraq present a tempting target for asymmetric warfare. Every student of Middle East politics realizes that undercutting their legitimacy with demonstrations that provoke forceful US reactions provide the most viable counter-strategy.

Unfortunately others outside the region appear to be reinforcing that counter-strategy. President Putin's refusal to help to lift the Iraqi sanctions is part of a broader effort to deny the US and Britain support and legitimacy for post-war tasks in Iraq.

And no matter how their leaders might protest, the four NATO members who met in Brussels to call for more EU planning and headquarters capabilities must have intended to force a wedge of greater separation from the US: not helpful as NATO begins discussions about its possible role in Iraq.

This military action was always intended to shake up the region and it certainly is doing that. The challenge is to transform change into net gain for peace and democracy. This will require much more than military power. We won't see blue skies for a while.