Nato's way forward uncertain as it takes on new members

General (ret.) Wesley K. Clark

April 16, 2003

Times of London

IN WASHINGTON the US Senate has been holding hearings on NATO expansion. Seven East European countries have been invited to join, subject to parliamentary approvals in existing NATO members. But in the aftermath of the shocking quarrels about defending Turkey, Turkey's unfortunate failure to support an American passage into northern Iraq and the stunning American and British military operation in Iraq, many in America and elsewhere are asking whether the alliance has outlived its purpose. Unfortunately, it is a timely question.

On one side are the US neo-conservatives who are hugely influential in Washington today and a strong predictor of the Administration's actions. They have seen a unique opportunity for America with the demise of the Soviet Union. And now, before China can rise, if American power is skillfully wielded, the United States can ensure that it is never challenged again.

This means first cleaning up the Middle East - a group of Arab and Islamist states that have sought weapons of mass destruction, supported terrorism and used oil as a weapon against the United States. The concept predated 9/11, but 9/11 gave impetus to the vision. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was the first step in a campaign that will seek fundamental changes in several countries in the region, or the overthrow of their regimes. The US Administration will brook no restraints on its ability to pivot on its success in Iraq to threaten or to act elsewhere.

For this group, NATO is useful but not central, or as some have said privately, "NATO - keep the myth alive." They seek membership for these seven states in some measure as a reward for throwing off the totalitarian yoke of the Soviet Union. They see NATO as helpful in stabilizing Europe as America turns its attention elsewhere. NATO might also be a kind of incubator for developing forces and even for creating a peace-operations force that could help to clean up the aftermath of war beyond Europe. But engage America as an equal, demanding participation in the decision-making - no way.

There is another group, comprised of leading figures in some European governments, including France, who has worked to have Europe assume a larger responsibility for its own security. For them, NATO is an American institution whose stated purpose - deterring Soviet adventurism into Europe - has been accomplished. In the words of one eminent French diplomat: "NATO belongs to you Americans, and you will never give it up." They sometimes seem to view NATO as an avenue for US domination of Europe and often seem to use it to modify or frustrate American aims.

This group came to accept another round of NATO enlargement partly because it seemed parallel to the European Union process, partly because Russia failed to resist steadfastly and partly for their own political and economic reasons. But they are already having doubts about the obviously pro-US sentiments in these new member states.

And then there are the traditional Atlanticists in Europe (and in the US Senate). They tend to believe that the United States should follow through on the designs of the post- Second World War period, seeking allies with whom to share the burdens of leadership, responding multilaterally if challenged, using force only as a last resort and following through on existing commitments and priorities. They view NATO as the appropriate institution to guide transatlantic co-operation and seek to deepen the security, commercial and cultural bonds between the two continents. NATO is an organization for collective action, but primarily for collective reaction. Caution is the byword.

For this group, enlargement is a natural outgrowth of Eastern Europe's democratization. This enlarges NATO's potential, but primarily it helps to complete the structure for dealing with Europe's security issues.

At this point NATO provides a real opportunity for transatlantic reconciliation, a kind of forum for good feelings to be transformed into specific actions in the War on Terror and control of weapons of mass destruction. Through work on policy issues and minor problems, dialogue about potential roles in Iraq, discussions of force structures, and meetings at the ministerial level, nations could bridge misunderstanding and forge new co-operation. NATO provides the working groups and bureaucracies that can serve as a "consensus engine".

But NATO is nothing more than the product of its member states. For NATO to have continuing significance Washington will have to seek NATO support - and that means consensus - and NATO participation in its most important security challenges. This will also require the Europeans, and especially France, to view the challenges as equally grave. Without a much greater US effort to seek multilateralism and to address the Palestinian issue, and greater French reconciliation to American perspectives, power and prerogatives, the United States and France will remain at odds, and a larger NATO will become even more concerned with its relevance and significance.

How ironic that as new states have clamored to join, NATO's most serious challenge is the diverging interests of its original members. Still, it will be better to "keep the myth alive" while a new vision is created, than to allow this great institution to fade away.