Strategists win their spurs with overhaul of military

General (ret.) Wesley K. Clark

April 12, 2003

Times of London

Raising the standard: a US Marine at Umm Qasr, Iraq's main port. The Americans' superior training has led to military success

WAR is the greatest proving ground for military theories and equipment. And the coalition success in Iraq will be exploited to plug the favourites. Was it "network centric" warfare? Was it the faithful M1A1 tank? How about the greatly improved precision strike capability? The flexibility of the overall theatre planning? After the 1991 Gulf War, the big winners were "precision strike" and "information warfare". The army and the navy invested heavily in improving precision strike. And at the same time, the after-action reviews showed our critical dependence on data communications in every function, from logistics to intelligence. Conventional military procurement programmes - tanks, trucks, helicopters, ships - were pruned and stretched, and forces were cut. Like the first Gulf War, this war has been successful, but with much more sustained ground combat. So let us go back to the basics to explain the outcome. Battles are not won by plans. Battles are really won by soldiers and airmen.

This campaign was a mismatch, but the fundamental source of the mismatch was training. Beginning in the early 1980s, the US Army adopted an extensive integrated training programme for soldiers, leaders and whole units. High-quality volunteers were recruited, sergeants schooled before promotion and commanders given special training courses. Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent each year in stressful operational training for battalions, brigades and divisions at special training centres.

Expert observers provided detailed, objective analysis of unit flaws detected in the exercises. The air force was doing the same thing. And the navy and Marines mostly followed suit.

And the character of the force - diverse, family-oriented, overwhelmingly Christian, drawn increasingly from lower socio- economic levels who see the values of hard work, discipline, and faith, and aspiring for education and advancement. Reborn after Vietnam, this is a force that will do more than simply protect American shores - it will rewrite military possibilities and drive American foreign policy. And maybe even more. As some are beginning to observe, not since the Roman legions . . . and you can write the end of this thought. The virtual rout that many witnessed on television, with US commanders describing engagements in which the Iraqis hardly fired back, was but a fraction of the force's potential.

Yes, the Iraqis were a fourth-rate force and, sure, the equipment helped, and so did the improved air force capability to strike enemy ground forces (though there were plenty of enemy forces left). But the most potent weapon was the soldiers: motivated and competent, they took the fight to the enemy, whether it was tanks under the palm trees or Fedayin in a building.

As for the plans and doctrine, the command at all levels, British and American, showed adaptability, changing the time of the attack, changing routes, changing objectives, redirecting airpower to emerging targets, and generally exploiting every opportunity. And this is a function of the remarkable enrichment of communications and data-processing at all levels, from vehicles automatically reporting their own locations via secure "internet" to full-motion colour video streaming from unmanned aerial vehicles being analyzed hundreds of miles from the battlefield, as well as superb commanders and staffs, from theatre-level down through brigades, battalions and companies.

Both "heavy" M1A1 tank-equipped units and the heliborne and wheel-mobile "light" infantry and special forces proved themselves. But it is still true, that if you want to close with and destroy the enemy in mounted combat, then you need vehicles with sufficient protection to defeat the widely distributed rocket-propelled grenade - and that means the tank is still required.

The postwar issue will be, how many are needed? And here, the budgeteers are likely to call for a reduction in the size of the heavy force, despite the best efforts of the US Army to defend its force structure, already the smallest since before the Second World War, and the pressing peace operations requirements. The counter-argument will be that cutting one of the army's ten divisions will save several billion dollars per year, modernization will improve the effectiveness of the remaining force, and peace operations should largely be turned over to allies. And perhaps some of the air forces fighter and attack squadrons, each of which is much more effective now with precision weapons, are also on the chopping block, for they have shown remarkable capabilities to break integrated air defenses, and efficiently strike ground targets with high precision.

The newest buzz is "transformation", generally accepted to be "network centric warfare", to be achieved by providing every ship, aircraft or army element the same battle picture and then optimally distributing the combat tasks, such as shooting or maneuvering. It will inevitably lead to smaller combat forces, hopefully not only more efficient but also more effective. Still, all of us who have been there know what any regimental sergeant major will tell you: the real secret of victory lies in the character, training and discipline of the troops. And this is something that we cannot give up.